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The E l i c i t a t i o n  of Continuous P r o b a b i l i t y  D i s t r i b u t i o n s *  
James E .  Matheson** and Robert L.  Winklere** 
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Various methods have been developed t o  a i d  an i n d i v i d u a l  
i n  a s s e s s i n g  (encoding) pe r sona l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  t o  be used 
i n  i n f e r e n t i a l  and decision-making s i t u a t i o n s  ( e  .g.  s e e  
Winkler [12], and S p e t z l e r  and S t a e l  von Hols te in  [9 ] )  . 
Included among t h e s e  e l i c i t a t i o n  procedures a r e  scor ing  
r u l e s ,  which encourage an a s s e s s o r  t o  r e v e a l  h i s  op in ions  
and t o  make h i s  s t a t e d  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  correspond with h i s  
judgments. Scor ing r u l e s ,  which invo lve  t h e  computation 
of a  score  based on t h e  a s s e s s o r ' s  s t a t e d  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  and 
on t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  a c t u a l l y  occurs ,  a r e  u s e f u l  i n  t h e  evalu-  
a t i o n  of p r o b a b i l i t y  a s s e s s o r s  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  t h e  e l i c i t a t i o n  
process  i t s e l f .  For genera l  d i s c u s s i o n s  of s c o r i n g  r u l e s ,  
s e e  Winkler [13], Murphy and Winkler [7], S t a e l  von Hols te in  
[lo], and Savaqe [8]. 
The development of  scor ing  r u l e s  h a s ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  been 
r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h e  e l i c i t a t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o r  
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d i s c r e t e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s .  I n  Winkler  [13] , it i s  
p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  s c o r i n g  r u l e s  developed f o r  d i s c r e t e  s i t u a -  
t i o n s  can  be  used t o  e l i c i t  con t inuous  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n s  through t h e  use  of  randomly gene ra t ed  p a r t i t i o n s  t h a t  
a r e  n o t  known t o  t h e  a s s e s s o r  a t  t h e  t ime of  e l i c i t a t i o n .  
The purpose  of  t h i s  paper  i s  t o  deve lop  c l a s s e s  o f  s c o r i n g  
r u l e s  based  on t h e  e n t i r e  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n  ( o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  
t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n )  r a t h e r  than  j u s t  on a  s e t  of  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  de termined from t h e  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n  v i a  a  
p a r t i t i o n .  We g e n e r a t e  an  ext remely  r i c h  set  of s c o r i n g  
r u l e s  t h a t  i n c l u d e s  p r e v i o u s l y  developed r u l e s  ( i n c l u d i n g  
d i s c r e t e  r u l e s )  a s  s p e c i a l  c a s e s  and p rov ides  t h e  e x p e r i -  
menter  w i t h  a  g r e a t  d e a l  of  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  choosing a  r u l e  
t h a t  is p a r t i c u l a r l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  a  g iven  s i t u a t i o n .  The 
f a m i l i e s  of  r u l e s  gene ra t ed  i n  S e c t i o n  2 a r e  based  on b i n a r y  
s c o r i n g  r u l e s ,  and t h e  f a m i l i e s  of  r u l e s  g e n e r a t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  
3 a r e  based  on a n o t h e r  type  of  payoff  f u n c t i o n ,  o r  s c o r i n g  
f u n c t i o n .  
2 .  The Genera t ion  of  Scor inq  Rules f o r  Continuous 
D i s t r i b u t i o n s  from Scor ing  Rules f o r  Binary  S i t u a t i o n s  
Consider  t h e  assessment  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  a  s i n g l e  
e v e n t  E .  We assume a  s u b j e c t  a s s i g n s  p r o b a b i l i t y  p t o  t h e  
occur rence  of  t h e  e v e n t ,  b u t  when asked t o  r e v e a l  h i s  prob- 
a b i l i t y  assignment s t a t e s  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  r which might  n o t  be 
equa l  t o  p.  A s c o r i n g  r u l e  S ( r )  g i v e s  t h e  s u b j e c t  a  payoff  
S ( r )  = S ( r )  is  t h e  e v e n t  o c c u r s  and S  ( r )  = S 2 ( r )  i f  it 1 
does  n o t .  The s u b j e c t ' s  e x p e c t e d  payoff  f o r  t h i s  b i n a r y  
s i t u a t i o n  i s  a c c o r d i n g l y  
and t h e  s c o r i n g  r u l e  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  s t r i c t l y  p r o p e r  i f  
The n o t i o n  o f  s c o r i n g  r u l e s  can be g e n e r a l i z e d  q u i t e  
e a s i l y  t o  t h e  assessment  o f  any d i s c r e t e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n .  Le t  Ei r e p r e s e n t  t h e  i t h  e v e n t  ( o r  i t h  v a l u e  o f  a  
random v a r i a b l e )  , where ~ E I  and I i s  f i n i t e  o r  coun tab ly  
i n f i n i t e .  Moreover, l e t  pi and ri cor re spond  t o  p  and r i n  
t h e  b i n a r y  s i t u a t i o n ,  and suppose t h a t  t h e  s c o r i n g  r u l e  
S ( r l , r 2 , . . . )  g i v e s  t h e  s u b j e c t  a  payoff  S . ( r l , r 2 ,  ... ) i f  E 
I j 
o c c u r s .  Then 
and S  is  s t r i c t l y  p rope r  i f  
when 
ri # pi , f o r  any ~ E I  . 
The l i t e r a t u r e  r e g a r d i n g  such  r u l e s  is  f a i r l y  e x t e n s i v e ;  
s e v e r a l  forms of  s t r i c t l y  p r o p e r  s c o r i n g  r u l e s  have been 
developed  ( e . g .  s e e  t h e  r e f e r e n c e s  g iven  i n  S e c t i o n  1). 
Three  f r equen t ly -encoun te red  examples a r e  t h e  q u a d r a t i c ,  
l o g a r i t h m i c ,  and s p h e r i c a l  s c o r i n g  r u l e s ,  which a r e ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
S . ( r 1 , r 2 ,  . . . I  = l o g  r 
I j ( 6 )  
and 
S c o r i n g  r u l e s  have been ex t ended  t o  t h e  con t inuous  c a s e  
by l i m i t i n g  a rguments .  I f  x  is t h e  r e v e a l e d  v a l u e  o f  t h e  
v a r i a b l e  o f  i n t e r e s t  and r ( * )  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n  
a s s i g n e d  by t h e  s u b j e c t ,  con t inuous  a n a l o g s  o f  t h e  q u a d r a t i c ,  
l o g a r i t h m i c ,  and s p h e r i c a l  s c o r i n g  r u l e s  a r e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
S ( r ( * ) )  = l o g  r ( x )  , (9) 
and 
a, f r = r x  r 2 ( x )  dx) . (10 )  
,a, 
Rul-es such  a s  t h e s e  a r e  s t r i c t l y  p r o p e r  s c o r i n g  r u l e s  f o r  t h e  
c o n t i n u o u s  c a s e .  I t  might  b e  a rgued ,  however, t h a t  such  r u l e s  
a r e  somewhat d e f i c i e n t .  For  example, t h e y  a r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n  a t  t h e  p r e c i s e  p o i n t  o f  t h e  
r e v e a l e d  v a l u e  o f  t h e  v a r i a b l e ,  b u t  n o t  t o  t h e  amount of  
p r o b a b i l i t y  mass nea rby .  The f o l l o w i n g  development  g e n e r a t e s  
con t inuous  r u l e s  from b i n a r y  r u l e s  t o  produce new con t inuous  
r u l e s  t h a t  a r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  e n t i r e  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  n o t  
j u s t  t o  t h e  d e n s i t y  a t  a  s i n g l e  v a l u e .  I n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  t h e  
r u l e s  g e n e r a t e d  h e r e  can  b e  t hough t  of  a s  s e n s i t i v e  t o  
d i s t a n c e  ( e . g .  s e e  S t a e l  von H o l s t e i n  [lo] ) . 
Cons ide r  t h e  a s se s smen t  of  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
f o r  a  v a r i a b l e  d e f i n e d  on t h e  r e a l  l i n e .  W e  assume t h e  
s u b j e c t  a s s i g n s  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  F ( . )  t o  
t h e  v a r i a b l e ,  b u t  when a sked  t o  r e v e a l  h i s  p r o b a b i l i t y  
ass ignment  s t a t e s  R ( . ) .  L e t  x be t h e  r e v e a l e d  v a l u e  o f  
t h e  v a r i a b l e  and  l e t  u  b e  an  a r b i t r a r y  r e a l  number we s h a l l  
use  t o  d i v i d e  t h e  v a r i a b l e  i n t o  two i n t e r v a l s  (see F i g u r e  1 1 ,  
I1 = (-m,u] and I2  = ( u , ~ ) .  L e t  E b e  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  x f a l l s  
i n  I1. Applying t h e  p r e v i o u s  s c o r i n g  r u l e  w i t h  t h e  i d e n t i -  
f i c a t i o n  p  = F ( u )  and r = R(u)  , we have  
and 
I f  S i s  s t r i c t l y  p r o p e r ,  t hen  
REVEALED 
DISTRIBUTION - R ( X  ) 
F IGURE 1. GENERATION OF PROBABILITY-ORIENTED 
SCORING R U L E S  
Thus, t h e  s u b j e c t  w i l l  maximize t h e  expected payoff by s e t t i n g  
Riu) = F ( u ) .  I f  t h e  s u b j e c t  does n o t  know the  value  of u ,  he 
c l e a r l y  should  s e t  R ( . )  = F ( * ) ;  however, h i s  payoff depends 
s t r o n g l y  on t h e  a r b i t r a r i l y  s e l e c t e d  va lue  of u.  To e l imi -  
n a t e  t h i s  dependence, we can simply i n t e g r a t e  S ( R ( u ) )  over  
a l l  u  and pay t h e  s u b j e c t  t h i s  amount, which i s  
The corresponding expected s c o r e  i s  
Equations ( 1 4 )  and (15)  a r e  i n  d i r e c t  analogy wi th  
Equations (11) and ( 1 2 ) .  Equation (15) can be  de r ived  a s  
t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  of Equation ( 1 4 )  with  an in te rchange  of 
o r d e r  of i n t e g r a t i o n .  I f  S i s  s t r i c t l y  p roper ,  then  S* i s  
s t r i c t l y  proper ,  and t h e  s u b j e c t  maximizes h i s  expected 
payoff by s e t t i n g  R(u) = F ( u )  f o r  each u.  The above 
approach i s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  some s c o r i n g  r u l e s  such a s  t h e  
q u a d r a t i c  s c o r i n g  r u l e ,  which w i l l  be considered l a t e r .  
However, t h e  r e q u i r e d  i n t e g r a l  may n o t  e x i s t  f o r  many 
o t h e r  important  r u l e s ,  such a s  t h e  l o g a r i t h m i c ,  s o  a  more 
g e n e r a l  method i s  needed. 
To i n c r e a s e  t h e  g e n e r a l i t y  and u s e f u l n e s s  of  t h e  above 
r e s u l t ,  we assume t h a t  t h e  experimenter s e l e c t s  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  G ( * )  f o r  u. A f t e r  a va lue  of  x has  
been r e v e a l e d ,  he  pays t h e  s u b j e c t  t h e  expec ted  s c o r e  us ing  
t h i s  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  The expec ted  s c o r e  g iven t h e  r evea led  
va lue  x i s  
and b e f o r e  x i s  r e v e a l e d  t h e  s u b j e c t ' s  expec ted  s c o r e  i s  
S i n c e  S i s  s t r i c t l y  p rope r ,  S** i s  a l s o  s t r i c t l y  p r o p e r ,  and 
t h e  s u b j e c t  maximizes h i s  expec ted  payoff  by s e t t i n g  
R(u) = F ( u )  f o r  each  u. I n c i d e n t a l l y ,  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  
expe r imen te r  cou ld  simply g e n e r a t e  a s i n g l e  v a l u e  from G ( * )  
and u s e  t h a t  v a l u e  t o  reward t h e  s u b j e c t  v i a  Equat ion  (11). 
However, a l though  t h e  mathemat ica l  r e s u l t s  a r e  i d e n t i c a l ,  
i t  seems p r e f e r a b l e  t o  pay t h e  expec ted  s c o r e  g iven by 
Equat ion  (16) i n s t e a d  of  t h e  s c o r e  o b t a i n e d  from a s i n g l e  
va lue  g e n e r a t e d  from G (  ) . 
I f  w e  w r i t e  Equat ion  (17) i n  d e n s i t y  form, 
we see t h a t  g ( * )  s e r v e s  a s  a we igh t ing  f u n c t i o n  which shou ld  
encourage t h e  s u b j e c t  t o  pay more a t t e n t i o n  t o  h i s  a s s e s s -  
ments where g ( u )  i s  h i g h e s t .  Thus, i f  c e r t a i n  r eg ions  of 
va lues  o f  t h e  v a r i a b l e  a r e  of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t ,  t h e  
exper imenter  might make g ( . )  h i g h e r  i n  t h e s e  r eg ions  than  
it i s  elsewnere .  Of c o u r s e ,  g (  ) could  be a  g e n e r a l  
weighting f u n c t i o n  ( i . e .  it is  n o t  necessa ry  f o r  G ( * )  t o  
be a  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n ) ,  b u t  t h i s  does n o t  
i n c r e a s e  t h e  g e n e r a l i t y  of our  r e s u l t s .  Techn ica l ly ,  G ( - )  
must be  s e l e c t e d  s o  t h a t  t h e  i n t e g r a l  of Equat ion (181,  
which depends on b o t h t h e  s c o r i n g  r u l e  and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  w i l l  e x i s t .  I f  t h e  i n t e r v a l  o f  d e f i n i t i o n  
i s  f i n i t e  o r  t h e  i n t e g r a n d  i s  well-behaved, g ( u )  can be 
s e l e c t e d  a s  uniform o r  " d i f f u s e "  t o  y i e l d  t h e  e a r l i e r  
r e s u l t s  of Equat ions  ( 1 4 )  and (15)  . 
T h i s  p rocess  g e n e r a t e s  cont inuous  s c o r i n g  r u l e s  from 
each b i n a r y  s c o r i n g  r u l e .  For i n s t a n c e ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
q u a d r a t i c  s c o r i n g  r u l e  de f ined  by 
and 
w i t h  
2  E ( S ( r ) )  = - p ( l  - r) - (1 - p) r 2  
The genera ted  cont inuous  q u a d r a t i c  c a s e  d e f i n e d  by Equat ions  
(16)  and (17)  is  a  payoff of  
and a n  expec ted  s c o r e  of  
I f  G ( . )  i s  " d i f f u s e , "  t h e n  dG(u) i s  r e p l a c e d  by du and t h e  
above e q u a t i o n s  have i n t e r e s t i n g  g r a p h i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ;  
it i s  l e f t  t o  t h e  r e a d e r  t o  s k e t c h  them.' I f  t h e  s u b j e c t  
s e t s  R(u)  = F ( u )  , t h e n  h i s  expec ted  s c o r e  i s  
which i s  a  measure of  t h e  d i s p e r s i o n  i n  h i s  t r u e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
ass ignment .  Thus, Equat ion  (22)  i s  t h e  sum of  two terms,  
t h e  f i r s t  rewarding hones ty  and t h e  second rewarding e x p e r t i s e  
o r  s h a r p n e s s .  Although p a r t i t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  q u a d r a t i c  s c o r i n g  
r u l e  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  " a t t r i b u t e s "  measured by e lements  of 
v a r i o u s  p a r t i t i o n s  have been s t u d i e d  ( e . g .  Murphy and 
E p s t e i n  [ 6 ]  , Murphy 1 4 ,  5 1  , it a p p e a r s  t h a t  p a r t i t i o n i n g  of 
t h e  f u n c t i o n  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  expec ted  s c o r e  h a s  n o t  been 
cons ide red .  
' ~ u r i n g  t h e  f i n a l  p r e p a r a t i o n  of  t h i s  p a p e r ,  we 
l e a r n e d  t h a t  Brown ( p e r s o n a l  communication) h a s  used  a  
d i f f e r e n t  approach t o  g e n e r a t e  a  r u l e  t h a t  i s  a p p a r e n t l y  
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  r u l e  g iven  by Equat ion  (21) w i t h  dG(u) 
r e p l a c e d  by du.  
Although t h i s  work was mot ivated by t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  
b e t t e r  continuous s c o r i n g  r u l e s ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  
f o r  any p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  func t ion  F ( - )  . Thus, they 
a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  d i s c r e t e  case .  Moreover, t h e  
continuous c a s e  can be d i s c r e t i z e d  by choosing G ( .  ) a s  a  
s t e p  f u n c t i o n .  For example, suppose t h a t  G ( * )  i s  a  s t e p  
func t ion  wi th  p o s i t i v e  s t e p s  g  1 , g 2 , . . . , g n  a t  u l <  u2 < * * '  < U  
n  
and t h a t  R ( u .  ) = Ri and F (u i )  = Fi f o r  i = 1 , 2 , .  . . ,n .  Then 
1 
t h e  q u a d r a t i c  b ina ry  s c o r i n g  r u l e  g e n e r a t e s  
j -1 n- 1 
2  2  S * * ( R ( * ) )  = - I  R i g i -  1 ( 1 - R i )  gi , i f x = u  (24) 
i= j j i=l 
and 
I f  g1 = - - g2 - - - gn,  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  usua l  q u a d r a t i c  r u l e ,  
b u t  i t  is  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  ranked p r o b a b i l i t y  s c o r e  ( e . g .  
E p s t e i n  [l] , Murphy [3] , S t a e l  von Hols te in  [lo] ) , which h a s  
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  p r o p e r t i e s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  ranked 
p r o b a b i l i t y  s c o r e  i s  s e n s i t i v e  t o  d i s t a n c e ,  and t h e  
procedures  d i scussed  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  can be used t o  
g e n e r a t e  c l a s s e s  of s c o r i n g  r u l e s  t h a t  a r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  
d i s t a n c e  f o r  t h e  cont inuous  case  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  d i s c r e t e  
case .  
3.  The Generation of Scor inq Rules f o r  Continuous 
D i s t r i b u t i o n  from Payoff Funct ions  o t h e r  than 
Binary Scor inq Rules 
The r u l e s  genera ted  i n  S e c t i o n  2  a r e  based on binary  
s c o r i n g  r u l e s .  Other r u l e s  f o r  cont inuous  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  
can be genera ted  from d i f f e r e n t  types  of  payoff f u n c t i o n s .  
A s  i n  S e c t i o n  2,  w e  assume t h a t  t h e  s u b j e c t  a s s i g n s  
p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  F  ( ) t o  t h e  v a r i a b l e  
of i n t e r e s t  b u t  s t a t e s  R ( * )  when asked t o  r e v e a l  h i s  
p r o b a b i l i t y  assignment.  I n  o r d e r  t o  t r e a t  t h e  c a s e s  of  
d i s c r e t e  p o i n t s  and z e r o - p r o b a b i l i t y  i n t e r v a l s  we s h a l l  
d e f i n e  t h e  i n v e r s e  func t ions  
- 1 F ( 2 )  = min ( u l ~ ( u )  -> z} 
u  
and 
- 1 R ( z )  = min ( u l R ( u )  2 zl 
u  
f o r  a l l  Z E  ( 0 , l )  . The t y p i c a l  case  is i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  
F igure  2.  
For any a r b i t r a r y  z~[0 ,1 ] ,  l e t  t h e  s u b j e c t  r e c e i v e  a  
payoff  according t o  t h e  r u l e  T ( R - ' ( Z ) ) .  I f  T  i s  s t r i c t l y  
p roper ,  t h e n  
where 
t REVEALED 
I DISTRIBUTION - R ( x ) 
' ION 
FIGURE 2. GENERATION OF VALUE- ORIENTED 
SCORING RULES 
For example, l e t  T r e p r e s e n t  a payoff func t ion  f o r  a 
Bayesian p o i n t  e s t i m a t i o n  problem under l i n e a r  l o s s  (e .g .  
see  Winkler El41  , pp. 397-405 ) . For t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  which 
is  o f t e n  c a l l e d  t h e  "newsboy problem," t h e  payoff func t ion  
can be represen ted  a s  follows: 
where ~ ( x )  i s  a func t ion  of x t h a t  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  payoff i f  
- 1 
x = R ( z )  ( i . e .  i f  t h e  newsboy o r d e r s  e x a c t l y  t h e  r i g h t  
number of  p a p e r s ) .  Assuming t h a t  
converges,  
is  maximized only f o r  ~ ~ ' ( 2 )  = F - l ( z )  . 
I f  t h e  s u b j e c t  does n o t  know t h e  va lue  of z ,  he should  
s e t  R ( - )  = F ( . ) ;  however, t h e  a c t u a l  payoff depends s t r o n g l y  
on t h e  a r b i t r a r i l y  s e l e c t e d  va lue  of z .  To e l i m i n a t e  t h i s  
dependence, we i n t e g r a t e  over  a l l  z and pay t h e  s u b j e c t  
The expected s c o r e  i s  then  
The i n t e g r a t i o n  over z is analogous t o  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  over  u 
i n  Sec t ion  2 .  I f  T is  s t r i c t l y  proper  then  T* i s  a l s o  
s t r i c t l y  proper ,  and t h e  s u b j e c t  maximizes h i s  expected 
payoff by s e t t i n g  R ( * )  = F ( *  ) . 
W e  can now g e n e r a l i z e  t h e  above r e s u l t  i n  a manner 
analogous t o  t h e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  represen ted  by Equation (16) 
i n  S e c t i o n  2 .  Assume t h a t  t h e  exper imenter  s e l e c t s  a 
p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  H(*) f o r  z .  A f t e r  a 
va lue  of x has  been revea led ,  t h e  s u b j e c t  i s  pa id  t h e  
expected s c o r e  us ing  H: 
Before x i s  revea led ,  t h e  s u b j e c t ' s  expected s c o r e  i s  
For example, t h e  payoff genera ted by t h e  s c o r i n g  r u l e  of 
Equation (30) is  
I f  T i s  s t r i c t l y  p roper ,  t h e  s u b j e c t  maximizes h i s  
expected payoff from Equation (35)  by s e t t i n g  R ( - )  = F ( * ) .  
H i s  s i m i l a r  t o  G i n  t h a t  dH(*)  s e r v e s  a s  a  weight ing f u n c t i o n  
which should  encourage t h e  s u b j e c t  t o  pay more a t t e n t i o n  t o  
h i s  assessments  where a(*)  is  h i g h e s t .  For example, i f  
t h e  exper imenter  is  p a r t i c u l a r l y  concerned about t h e  
extreme t a i l s  of  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  he  might s e l e c t  a  
U-shaped a( - ) :  i f  t h e  middle of  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  is of 
i n t e r e s t ,  dH(-) might be  taken t o  be symmetric and unimodal 
wi th  mode a t  z = 0.5. Of course ,  diI ( ) can simply be 
uniform, i n  which c a s e  Equations (34) and (35) reduce t o  
Equat ions  (32) and (33) . I f  only  c e r t a i n  f r a c t i l e s  a r e  of 
i n t e r e s t ,  H (  ) can be  chosen a s  a  s t e p  func t ion  wi th  
p o s i t i v e  s t e p s  h l ,h2,  ..., h a t  z l <  z2 < * * *  < z  rn m ' 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we have genera ted  a  family of s c o r i n g  
r u l e s ,  wi th  each member of t h e  family  corresponding t o  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  cho ice  of T ( * )  and H ( * ) .  This  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  covered i n  Sec t ion  2, where each member of t h e  
family  of s c o r i n g  r u l e s  t h a t  is  generated corresponds  t o  
a  p a r t i c u l a r  choice  of  S ( * )  and G(.). The two f a m i l i e s  
a r e  completely d i f f e r e n t ,  however. The s c o r i n g  r u l e  S ( . )  
i s  def ined  on t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  space  ( t h e  u n i t  i n t e r v a l ) ,  
whereas T ( . )  is  def ined  on t h e  space of va lues  of t h e  
v a r i a b l e  of  i n t e r e s t  ( t h e  r e a l  l i n e ) .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  
cho ice  of  a  p a r t i c u l a r  r u l e  might be  based p r i m a r i l y  on 
convenience and on psychological  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  
t h e  e l i c i t a t i o n  procedure.  For i n s t a n c e ,  exper imenta l  
r e s u l t s  sugges t  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  e l i c i t a t i o n  techniques  may 
y i e l d  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s  ( e . 9 .  s e e  Tversky and Kahneman 
[ll] and Kahneman and Tversky [2] . C l e a r l y  such f a c t o r s  
need t o  be i n v e s t i g a t e d  f u r t h e r .  
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